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Successful firms are often thought of as being preoccupied with “products and profits,” and 
it is not surprising that in the United States, for example, 76% of industrial (versus govern- 
ment or university) research is devoted to the development (versus applied or basic 
research) of new products, processes and materials (Jain & Triandis, 1990, p. 3). 
In spite of this emphasis on development, relatively little is known about two aspects of 
the innovation process: the concept development phase of research, development, and 
engineering and the cross-national differences in approaches to new product development. 
In this study, we begin to explore this new ground with case study comparisons in five 
countries. 
Idea Generation for Innovation 
Although we know that successful new products come from companies that know their 
customers’ needs, relatively little is known about the early stages of the development cycle 
when new ideas are born (Ettlie, 1991). Only the rare talent can marry new technology with 
the customer need that is truly unsatisfied-and often customer needs are not even articu- 
lated or consciously realized. It seems clear that creativity, in this regard, is the result of a 
subtle interaction of personality and job environment (Hage, 1980; Ettlie & O’Keefe, 1982; 
Jain & Triandis, 1990, p. 56; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990). 
The obvious need to find and keep outstanding talent (Diebold, 1990, p. 173) and the 
necessity for teams of engineers and other functional or discipline competent professionals 
to design products and processes of manufacture simultaneously (Clark & Fujimoto, 
1991), appears to be widely recognized. But the notion that one might manage the first 
stage of product development-before general requirements are dreamed of-using a 
totally different approach is not well understood. You can’t “team” an ideal generation pro- 
cess when a person has not decided to go public with an idea. And you can’t “reward” a 
competent person, if there is no visible product of work associated with a “thought.” 
A simple case history might help to illustrate this point. At a recent conference on 
“speed to market” for new products, a story of new product development was presented. 
After the talk, the presenter was asked if there was anything truly new in the firm’s 
approach to the product’s introduction, or if they had done this before. The answer was 
quite interesting. Instead of using the tried and true method of consistent team leadership 
and membership, the project had been divided into two parts. There was an “entrepreneur- 
ial” phase of the project with one manager, and then the project was turned over to a team 
and new project manger for the latter stages of development. Not only did this approach 
turn out to be far better than past firm performances in this product area, it violated all the 
“street-wise” rules one often follows in the R&D management game (Boston University, 
School of Management, March 18-20, 1991). 
A second case history is even more revealing on this point. We recently worked with an 
aerospace firm to document the design process. Among other things, we found that at least 
50% of new product costs are determined before concurrent engineering begins. Concept 
development accounts for one-half of cost determination in this category of aircraft jet 
engines. 
In short, there seems to be a widespread notion that once we have mastered the team 
approach to simultaneous engineering, we will automatically be able to get to the market 
faster with high quality products. We contend that this is only part of the answer. A focus 
on the pre-simultaneously engineering aspects of product development is needed. 
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Cross-National Comparisons 
Cross-national analysis has gradually increased in importance within the broad area of 
research on technology and innovation management. It recently enjoyed equal billing with 
topics like micro and macro organizational theory, strategy, and economics (Goodman & 
Sproull, 1990). Up until recently, it had been fashionable to use the “power distance,” con- 
struct from Hofstede’s (1980) research at IBM, which includes cultural differences on 
acceptance of power of boss and subordinate. His other dimensions included uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Now it seems there are alternative constructs 
and measures (Keller & Chinta, 1990; Lynn, 1990). In particular it might be desirable to 
make comparisons on differences in professional orientation (Van Maanen & Barley, 
1984), the use of teams (Ettlie, 1992), and the technological imperative (Markus & Robey, 
1988; Lynn, 1990). 
There is preliminary evidence that cultural differences do exist for U.S.-Gennan-Scan- 
dinavian comparisons on design practices. German technical training could lead to easier 
design-manufacturing integration (Lynn, 1990, p. 189). Swedish standardization of design 
practices could have the same effect (Trygg, 1991). Lee and Wallbaum (1991) report that 
in 1989, apprenticeship enrollment in the U.S. was 283,352 or about 0.2% of the 125 mil- 
lion labor force. In Germany, the enrollment for the same period was 1,657,960 or about 
6% of the 30 million labor force. The differences are due in great measure to the role of 
government support of work force training. 
This confirms part of the findings of earlier work reported by Limprecht and Hayes 
(1982). The management hierarchy in German firms was observed to be consistently 
staffed with people strong in technical backgrounds and apprenticeship programs made it 
easier for workers to incorporate manufacturing technologies. The Germans emphasize 
well-engineered, high quality products, delivered on time with excellent service. German 
firms tended to accept lower profit margins in order to be more competitive and empha- 
sized long term stability and growth. There is also evidence of U.S.-Japanese differences in 
managing R&D as well as product development. The Japanese seem to engage in more 
teamwork earlier in the development cycle (Hull & Azumi, 1989) and they seem to be able 
to bring new products to markets faster than their American counterparts (Mansfield, 
1988). 
There is evidence that there are considerable differences between the U.S., Europe and 
Japan in employee practices in general, and R&D human resource policies in particular. 
Tomlinson, Paulson, Arai, and Briggs (1991) studied 324 businesses in Denmark, Italy, 
Scotland, the U.S. and Japan. In Japan, the employee was considered the strongest stake- 
holder, whereas the European and American companies report the customer as the key 
stakeholder, followed closely by owners. In Japan, unions are partners with management, 
both in decision-making and productivity improvement. Although this tends not to be true 
in the U.S. and Europe, there is optimism for change, due in great measure to increased 
competitive pressures. 
During the period 1960-1987, the growth rate of new products in Japan was more than 
double that of the U.S., as was the rate of growth of firm R&D, and this can be particularly 
attributed to the Japanese “share plus wage system,” (Quinn & Rivoli, 1991). However, 
this difference seems to result as much from the internationalization of markets as it does 
from some inherent advantage of the Japanese compensation system to promote innova- 
tion. What is more, there appears to be an argument that trying to adopt just one aspect of 
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another culture’s compensation and incentive system (e.g., life-time employment) may 
introduce as many problems as it solves. 
However, it is not always clear why these differences exist or the extent to which such 
variance is culture determined. Hagerty and Hoffman (1990) found that the outcomes of 
comprehensive planning varied in Anglo, Germanic, and Nordic countries. Anglo firms 
with better planning had greater return on sales while Germanic firms with better plans had 
greater return on assets. Nordic firms had greater sales growth when they were comprehen- 
sive planners. In another study, Schneider and DeMyer (1991) found differences in 
interpretation of risk by strategic planners across cultures. 
It seems highly likely that firms within countries participating in durable goods manu- 
facturing will differ in their approach to the concept development phase of new product and 
process launch. They obviously differ in the emphasis and value placed on various aspects 
of the design process, but the question is whether this variance is detectable using the meth- 
odologies currently available to study this phenomenon, and whether or not it makes a 
difference in performance. For example, German manufacturing is likely to have more 
technical managers, and Eastern and Central European countries have had less access to 
computer-aided design technologies. Both circumstances are likely to have consequences 
in design approach. 
It also seems clear that cross-national differences are often a matter of philosophy and 
perceptions as much as actual measurable practices. Cole (1990) has made extensive com- 
parisons between the U.S. and Japanese automobile industry, for example, and finds that 
the Japanese not only incorporate new technology in their continuous improvement pro- 
grams, but also have very sensitive perceptions of very small quality differences. In the 
U.S., technology adoption and development are often done in parallel to manufacturing 
productivity enhancement and product development. Further, Cole (1990) found that the 
differences in perception of measurable outcomes like 1.6 defects per vehicle versus 1 .O 
defects per vehicle are quite important to the Japanese but perceived as very subtle and, 
therefore, less important in the U.S. 
METHODOLOGY 
Lynn (1990) reviewed the state-of-the-art of research on technology management for cross- 
national studies and recommended comparative case studies because of the nascent stage 
of development of this research area. Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that the case study 
approach could be used as a theory-building exercise. This is the approach that was taken 
in this study. 
With the collaboration of colleagues, five firms were selected from short lists of estab- 
lished durable goods manufacturers well-known and accessible to the research team. One 
case from each of five of the major economic alliances or regions of the world was nomi- 
nated: the U.S. to represent North America; Sweden to represent EFTA; Germany to 
represent the ECC; Hungary to represent the old COMACON trading bloc and Japan to 
represent the far east. Only six firms had to be asked to generate five cases. 
In all but one case, two colleagues conducted the interview of one primary respondent 
in the firm. In one case (Hungary), two secondary respondents also participated in the 
interview. In the Japanese case, the interview schedule was used as a mailed questionnaire. 
Follow up faxes were used for clarification. The Japanese respondent was eventually inter- 
viewed in Japan for the project and provided additional data. The American researcher 
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visited four of the five firms. In each country (except Japan, as noted), one colleague who’s 
first language was that of the host nation also helped conduct the interview. In the Hungar- 
ian case, the collaborator also translated much of the proceedings. In each case the initial 
contact with the firm was made by the host country colleague and then the interview sched- 
ule and other materials were shared before scheduling appointments requesting 
cooperation. Confidentiality was guaranteed in all cases. 
Wherever possible, we used “visual data” as cues for respondents to describe their 
design process (Meyer, 1991). That is, in the case of describing their technology to support 
design and their barriers to concurrent engineering, outline materials were handed to the 
person to reflect on and help structure responses. Respondents were all new product, new 
process, or R&D managers, and intimate with new products in their firm. 
Although this was an exploratory study, several differences between these firms were 
expected to show up in both economic and accounting type measures of product and pro- 
cess development as well as general approaches to design. These differences are 
highlighted below. On the other hand, all of these companies have been operating for a long 
time and would be considered successful enterprises with a bright future by most standards. 
RESULTS 
The preliminary comparisons of these five durable goods producers was made in three gen- 
eral categories. 
1. They were compared on general, background characteristics (e.g., organizational 
size). 
2. They were compared on their approach to concept development and idea generation 
for projects. 
3. And finally, they are compared on their overall capabilities and practices of devel- 
opment as well as design-manufacturing integration (Ettlie & Stoll, 1990). 
In Table 1, the responses concerning changes in the process of product development are 
summarized. In all five companies, representatives said they had a program to upgrade cur- 
rent product development practice. Four of five said that quality and time to market were 
part of this program. The Hungarian, Swedish and American firms said suppliers were part 
of the program. Hungary and Sweden were modernizing their plants. The German and 
Swedish firms were reorganizing. The German firm reported the least number of areas 
(most focused?) of program change at three; Hungary was next with five. The Japanese 
firm reported only one reason: patents. Perhaps, this was due to the fact that the respondent 
was a senior, high-ranking R&D manager. 
The results of the other comparisons appear in the summary presented in Table 2 below. 
Information in this table is divided into three categories: 
1. background information; 
2. concept development information; and 
3. design-manufacturing integration. 
All of these firms are relatively large and they all supply industrial or consumer markets in 
durable goods industries. The Swedish, Japanese, and American firms are publicly held, 
while the German firm is still owned by members of the founding family. The Hungarian 
144 THE JOURNAL OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH Vol. ~/NO. 2/1993 
TABLE 1 
Cross-national Comparisons: 
Changing The Process Of Product Development8 (n=5) 
Germany 
(electric 
Areas of Program Change motors) 
Quality 4 
Time to Market 4 
Suppliers 
Plant Modernization 






Program Area Totals 3 
Hungary U.S. Japan 
(Trans. Sweden (Plastics (Business 
Equip.) (Aerospace) Equip.) Machines) 
4 4 
4 4 4 
4 4 4 
4 
“All four companies representatives reported they were in the process of upgrading the product development process in their firms 
Country and Case 
firm is most unique in its ownership. It is owned 30% by a Russian Monetary Group, 50% 
by the Hungarian government and 20% of its stock are about to be traded on the public 
market. 
Product Life Cycles and R&D 
The current product life cycle of these firms varies from about 25 years for the Swedish 
aerospace components supplier to seven years for the American plastics equipment OEM. 
When compared to the projected life cycle of new products, we get some, but not all, pre- 
dictable results (c.f., Ettlie & Warner, 1991) for the German and U.S. cases: there is an 
anticipation in these two durable goods manufacturers that their product’s future life cycle 
will be shorter. In the case of the German firm, the expectation is that it will change from 
the current 10 years to 5-10 years. In the case of the American firm, current life cycles of 
seven years are expected to become five years. 
In Hungarian and Swedish firms-both in transportation industries (ground mass transit 
and aerospace respectively)--we see a different pattern. The Hungarian company expected 
the life cycle of its product to increase from 7-10 years to 15 years because of increased 
durability of products and extended warranty guarantees. In the case of the Swedish aero- 
space division, product life cycles are not expected to change and are the longest among 
these durable goods manufacturers at 20-30 years. In the Japanese consumer products firm, 
product life-cycle was likely to increase from three to five years. 
The Hungarian firm exports the greatest amount of product (in excess of 90%). Next 
came the Japanese firm at 70%, then the German firm at 60% export and then the Swedish 
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Current and projected development periods summarized in Table 2, and with two excep- 
tions, all follow a typical pattern (Ettlie & Warner, 1991)-they are all getting shorter. The 
German electric motor company currently takes four years to develop a new product but 
their goal is to reduce this by 50% to two years. The Hungarian company takes six years to 
develop a new product but wants to shorten this to 4.5 years-a 25% reduction. Even 
though life-cycles are expected to be constant in the foreseeable future for the Swedish 
aerospace company, they want to reduce development time from 10 years to 7 years for a 
new product-a 30% reduction. 
The American and Japanese firms seem to be satisfied with their current development 
period which was reported to be nine months and 10 years, respectively. However, the Jap- 
anese respondent also noted in a followup interview that the 10 years (see Note in Table 2) 
refers to basic research to new business, not existing technology. Further, development 
time is likely to increase because of environment (ecological) concerns. 
The American firm has the most favorable ratio of product life cycle to development 
period (seven years divided by 0.75 years = 9.33 years). That is, this company returns 9.33 
years of product life for every year invested in new product development. This firm also 
has the highest percentage annual revenues from new products (100%) and spends the 
next-to-the most (behind the Japanese firm), as a percentage of revenues, on R&D: 4.1%. 
It seems clear that the strategy of the American plastics equipment firm is to emphasize 
R&D supported new products and the revitalization of their design practices reported dur- 
ing the interview substantiate this. 
The ratio of product life cycle to development period is 2.5 years for both the German 
firm (10 years divided by four years) and the Swedish aerospace division (25 years divided 
by 10 years). The Hungarian firm returns 1.4 years of life cycle for every year devoted to 
new product development (8.5 years divided by six years). All three of these companies 
spend about the same amount on R&D as a percentage of sales: approximately 2%. The 
Japanese firm was an outlier in both respects. It spent the most on R&D (5% of sales) and 
only got one-third of a year back in life cycle (three years) for every year spent developing 
product (10 years). Since it was the only consumer durable in the sample, this does not 
seem surprising. They sought to increase (by two yrs) their product life cycle, which may 
be an important finding. 
Concept Development and New Ideas 
Perhaps one of the most interesting and important sections of the interviews was 
devoted to investigating how new ideas and concepts are born in these four firms. All had 
a unique approach to new product midwifery. In the German company, most ideas come 
from the design department, which would be expected from the culture’s technical and 
organizational traditions. The sales department gives advice and feedback from customers, 
but the opinion was that these are immediate, short-term customer needs only. In order to 
anticipate future, long-term customer needs, more has to be done. Designers typically visit 
customers or interact with potential buyers at trade shows and fairs. The technical project 
leader provides vision and direction in this German company. 
In the Hungarian mass transit vehicle company, the concept development process is 
driven by RFPs (requests for proposals or quotes), usually from local municipalities. But 
this is truly a global company, supplying product to many U.S. major cities and many other 
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countries around the world, so there is great variance in these requests. There appears to be 
a 50-50 play between understanding these RFPs and the “creative hats” of design teams. 
The Swedish aerospace company supplies components to the European consortium 
which builds the Ariane 5 launcher and the Vulcain engine. The cooperative arrangement 
between funding governments in this consortium provides a very unique context for prod- 
uct development in this company. Since there is a sharing of tasks among countries, the 
firm with the greatest expertise will be contracted to supply a component. With reasonable 
certainty, companies in the consortium can rely on future contracts and can “work ahead” 
in the development cycle. This could reduce technological uncertainty by providing the 
needed time to resolve technical issues and stabilize human resource allocation. 
The American plastics equipment manufacturer appears to stress a team approach to 
concept development. Both marketing and technical representatives influence which ideas 
are reviewed. Division management then reviews these proposals, or even suggests ideas 
on occasion regardless of type of change proposed: new products, product enhancements 
and development work. Technical services and distribution have a role in documenting cus- 
tomer need information along with distribution. Engineering has the responsibility of 
seeing that technological development keeps pace and is timed with this process of idea 
generation. The Japanese firm seemed nearly identical in its approach-a mix of top down- 
bottom up and marketing-R&D “hints”. 
Design-Manufacturing Integration 
Considerable attention has been focused on concurrent engineering during the last five 
years (e.g., Nevins & Whitney, 1989). Some base-line data on organizational policy and 
structural practices used to facilitate coordination between functions and disciplines is 
available (e.g., Ettlie & Stoll, 1990). Questions from earlier survey work were used to 
gauge these five comparative cases. 
The ratio of design to manufacturing engineers varied considerably across these compa- 
nies. The most extreme ratio was for the Japanese company: three (product) to one 
(manufacturing engineers). In German firm, the ratio was 2:1-the same as the Swedish 
aerospace division. The ratio in the American firm was 1: 1. In the Hungarian firm, there 
were more manufacturing engineers than designers where the ratio was 1:3. In the 1987 
base-line data (Ettlie & Stoll, 1990), the average ratio in U.S. firms was 2.9: 1. In the 1991 
survey of 43 American durable goods manufacturers, this ratio was 4.7: 1 (Ettlie & Warner, 
1991). The Japanese firm most closely matched the U.S. averages from previous survey 
work. 
The proportion of degreed design and manufacturing engineers was most even in the 
German firm at 100% and 100% respectively. In fact, the question really has little meaning 
in the German company-all engineers are degreed, naturally. Otherwise they could not be 
called engineers. The Japanese firm was next in order with an estimated ratio of 95% 
degreed design engineers to 80% degreed manufacturing engineers. 
In Hungary, there is a similar pattern, although parity is achieved at a lower absolute 
level: 70% degreed design engineers and 70% degreed manufacturing engineers. This 
seems consistent with the cultural history of Hungary and the influence of German prac- 
tices on Hungarian industry during modem times. 
In the Swedish aerospace company there is a substantial gap in degreed engineers. 
Although 90% of design engineers are degreed, only 10% of manufacturing engineers have 
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a degree. In the American firm, 60% of design engineers were degreed versus 15% of man- 
ufacturing engineers. In the recent survey of U.S. practices (Ettlie & Warner, 199 1) median 
levels for degreed design and manufacturing engineers were 90% and 60% respectively. 
In the recent survey of design practices of 43 American companies (Ettlie & Warner, 
1991), it was found that disciplines and functions most often represented on the design 
team outside of engineering continue (from 1987) to be marketing and quality. There is an 
echo in this finding from these five companies. In the German firm, production planning, 
sales and quality are the three outside functions on the design team. In Hungary, sales and 
suppliers are represented. In the Swedish firm, quality assurances (QA), material and aero- 
dynamics laboratories, as well as instrumentation are represented. In the U.S. company, 
purchasing, marketing, inventory and technical services are included in the focused design 
effort. Only the Hungarian firm reported using Quality Function Deployment (QFD)- 
“House of Quality.” 
The Swedish and American firms seem to be the most diverse in there breadth of disci- 
plines and functions included in the design process. However, only the American firm 
reports doing any benchmarking for design and development practices. About half of the 
U.S. firms surveyed recently did this type of benchmarking (Ettlie & Warner, 1991). The 
Japanese had the most missing data and said that “concurrent engineering” had no meaning 
to them. Like other reports from Japan, it is disciplines organized into project or product 
departments that is most descriptive (Fruin, 1991). 
Key success factors for design are also consistent with earlier findings, when reported. 
The German firm and American firm put the customer first and get ideas for new products 
from customers. The Hungarian firm, responding to RFPs, felt that production documenta- 
tion was most important. The Swedish firm did not answer this question. Again, the 
Japanese representative did not comment on this question. 
Barriers to achieving high quality designs, quickly, were also reported by four compa- 
nies, but integration of functions did not appear in any of the answers, which was 
unexpected (c.f., Ettlie & Warner, 1991). The German, Hungarian, and American compa- 
nies all emphasized resource constraints as the biggest barrier to achieving design goals. 
The Japanese firm mentioned resources as an issue elsewhere. In the Hungarian case, this 
included the absence of successful installation of a CAD system company-wide. Both the 
American and Hungarian firm complained about the lack of engineering tools and lack of 
trained engineers. Like other U.S. firms surveyed recently (Ettlie & Warner, 1991), the 
American plastics firm listed “time pressures” as the biggest barrier to product develop- 
ment. Cycle time reduction was thought to be a strategic opportunity in manufacturing, not 
a barrier. Rethinking this issue is clearly in order. Cycle time reduction in R&D, product 
development and design is not as obvious as it might seem. 
Structural adaptations that were reported by four of these five firms were quite 
expected. The German, Hungarian, Japanese and American firms all reported using teams 
to facilitate design-manufacturing integration. The Swedish firm reported adopting new 
prototyping procedures. 
In previous surveys in the U.S., a set of five design-manufacturing integrating practices 
have been monitored (Ettlie & Stoll 1990; Ettlie & Warner, 1991). These include the use of 
outside training and development in design-for-manufacturing techniques, the adoption of 
manufacturing sign-off at design review stages, the installation of new structures (e.g., 
teams) to help coordination, job rotation between functions, and mobility between func- 
tions. We score the adoption of these practices as follows: “yes” = 3; “no” = 1, and “in- 
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process of adoption” = 2. The minimum score possible is five and the maximum possible 
is 15. The scores for these four cases and the norms (means and standard deviations) from 
two previous surveys are presented in Table 2. 
The Swedish aerospace company reported adopting design-manufacturing integration 
practices at the highest level of these four cases. With a score of 12, they were above the 
other cases and above the mean score in the U.S. survey from 1987 (9.15) as well as the 
U.S. mean in 1991 (11.44). The German and American firms were tied at a score of 10 each 
which means they adopted three of the five practices, and were in process on a fourth. The 
Japanese firm used two of these methods (sign-off and structure-teams) and scored a nine, 
but also said terms like “concurrent engineering” have little meaning in the company. This 
suggests that other means or the dominance of teams takes the place of this index. The 
Hungarian firm, which also reported structural problems as a barrier to good design prac- 
tices, scored lowest with an eight on this measure. Given that the Hungarian firm had limits 
to reinvestment of revenues for so many years, it is not surprising that they report difficul- 
ties in achieving design goals, but they are aware of the challenge. 
THE CULTURAL WAY TO DESIGN 
Is there a “German Way” to design? Is there a Hungarian Way (“Goulash Design”)? Is there 
a typically Swedish approach to Design? Is there an American or Japanese way? We asked 
this question and all the answers were all the same-No, ufcourse not. No attempt was 
made in this exploratory study to determine whether industry differences swamp cultural 
differences or if company culture is more important than competitive environment, and so 
on. But one gets the impression that the seeds of a comparative base needed to answer the 
question of which aspects of product development are more influenced by ambient culture 
are present in these cases and provide guidance for future research. The Japanese respon- 
dent added that his company is not typical of Japan, either. 
Some illustrations provide insight into this question. It seems beyond chance that the Ger- 
man firm has parity in degreed design and manufacturing engineers at the 100% level. It is 
what one expects in Germany and of the stereotypical German approach to technical prob- 
lems-thorough, painstaking, and with high technical standards. Given the historical 
influence of Germany on Hungary, it is not surprising to see parity in the latter, but at a dimin- 
ished (resource constrained) level in engineering degrees (70% and 70% respectively). The 
Japanese firm was comparable with a 95%-80% split. Since product development is, in part, 
a very technical activity, one would expect that this type of measure might capture these cul- 
ture-dependent aspects of the design process. On the other hand, the Hungarians are known 
for their entrepreneurial approach to business, so it is not surprising that they are the only 
ones to actually mention emphasizing a “creative” approach to product development. 
The dominance of design engineering in Swedish firm might be attributed to industry fac- 
tors, but perhaps there is more to this. In some respects, the Swedish and German approach, 
if there is such a thing, are similar: they both have similar ratios of design to manufacturing 
engineers, but the Swedish firm has many more degreed designers (90% vs. 10%). 
AN EMERGENT MODEL OF CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON DESIGN 
In a recent interview with a manufacturing engineering manager at a large American aero- 
space firm, it was learned that design department dominance is typical in this industry. 
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Manufacturing engineers have much less to say about design, even in very successful aero- 
space companies, than design engineers. This suggests that the design department in the 
Swedish firm has more freedom than in the other firms of this small case sample, and per- 
haps this is the way it is preferred in Sweden. The Swedish and Japanese cases are also 
unique in their dependence, by explicit mention, on R&D laboratory work in developing 
and testing technology. The fact that this Swedish aerospace division represents only a 
small fraction of business activity of that corporation appears to have little relevance to 
design practice and product development. Not coincidently, the Japanese firm reported the 
highest R&D intensity (5%, at least, of sales). 
Perhaps the most encouraging finding of these five case comparisons is the unique 
approach used for concept development and generation of ideas. This suggests that the 
early phases of design which, heretofore, have been least structured, are most subject to 
cultural differences. Hellwig (1992) reports that for “product genesis,” or the “evolution of 
an idea into a manufactured and marketed product” (p. 77), there are considerable differ- 
ences between U.S. and Japanese firms. American firms consider all aspects of this process 
proprietary, and in the case of high technology industries, applied research and basic 
research are also considered proprietary. American consortia rarely go beyond basic 
research and often restrict foreign participation. Cooperative projects in Japan are often 
extended through prototyping and foreign firms are often invited to join. Lack of language 
skills by non-Japanese participants is not necessarily a barrier to cooperation with scientists 
or technology managers. Furthermore, there appears to be a convergence between the U.S. 
and Japan in mutual emulation of approaches. Japan is moving away from large markets 
(e.g., consumer electronics) and towards U.S. strengths in small, specialty markets (e.g., 
medical instruments). American firms are joining with Japanese firms in large market areas 
(like automobiles). Japanese efforts to learn from the U.S. are often initiated by their gov- 
ernment programs like MIT1 (Ministry of International Trade and Industry). 
Osbom and Baughn (1993) note in their review that the increasing pace of technological 
change globally has lead to the simultaneous commercialization of new products in such 
high technology industries as aerospace, and that industry boundaries become blurred 
when technologies contributing to new products are merged (e.g., pharmaceuticals and bio- 
technology; computers and telecommunications). Countries that emphasize high 
technology industries avoid direct competition with developing nations, as well. Since glo- 
bal technology alliances are prone to failure (Osborn & Baughn, 1993), examination of 
high versus low technology industries across nations and cultures seem logical. American 
firm direct investigation of Japanese R&D and investment in U.S. endowed research chairs 
at University by the Japanese are trends which confirm this proposition (Moffat, 1991). 
Therefore, the dimension that seems to be needed here in order to keep industry and 
technology differences in mind, is the high-tech, low-tech distinction. Gomez-Mejia 
(1991) distinguishes high technology firms from traditional companies using 13 dimen- 
sions. These include characterizing high technology firms as incorporating cutting edge 
technology in products, shorter product life-cycles, typical of the electronics, computer, 
and chemical industries, with a high rate of innovation, relatively high R&D intensity 
(more than 6- 10% of sales spent on R&D), a high proportion of R&D employees with high 
personnel turnover in the technical ranks, often with a high rate of growth but greater mor- 
tality, and with higher, but more variable profits. 
Although Gordon (199 1) argues convincingly that industry is an important determinant 
of organizational culture, it can also be argued that industries cluster in at least these two 
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categories of high and low technology. Doz (1986) studied multinational firms and found 
that technology driven companies were more likely to use economic-integration as a strat- 
egy versus political responsiveness. These companies tend to be global and are less likely 
to be influenced by local conditions. There are some exceptions, of course. 
There are a number of practical, methodological, and theoretical issues that are raised by 
the distinction between high and low tech industrial activity. For practical reasons, the rel- 
ative scarcity of such engineering skills as software development, may be a barrier to both 
firm and industry growth and competitiveness. Some industries and countries are at a rela- 
tive disadvantage in this regard. 
The preferred methodology of cross-national research is also influenced by the dynam- 
ics of industries and the clustering of same. That is, if one were to choose groups of 
industries without empirically validating that they go together, or pick clusters of countries 
without establishing that certain fundamental characteristics of their populations were 
related (e.g., common history or language), there would be questions of interpretation. In 
other words, one has to be careful when establishing a percent in research that cannot be 
well understood or replicated. 
Finally, the theory of innovation processes that included new product development, 
which takes into account the idea that culture can be represented by nation clusters and that 
industries cluster in meaningful ways is challenging to develop and begging to be tested. 
One of the reasons for this challenge is uniquely felt in the United States and North Amer- 
ica. What we are often modeling here is the relative difference between clusters like culture 
and high technology rather than which dimension to include. North America, like Europe, 
persists as a very pluristic cultural domain with a multitude of industry types. Japan now 
shares center stage with at least four, and more accurately six, newly industrialized coun- 
tries in the Far East. Therefore, we have what is often called the ‘within group’ versus the 
‘between group variance issue. Add a third group (degree of technology churning-high 
versus low tech) and it creates some theoretical challenges, indeed. 
In high-tech industries, it could be argued that early stages of product development-like 
the preconcept and concept development stages-are less likely to show cultural influences 
because science dominates (Osborn, 1992, personal communication). Although scientific 
work communities may act differently in the U.S. and Japan (e.g., Traweek, 1988), when 
basic research is an integrated part of corporate product development, it is hypothesized that 
cultures converge into similar forms of work routines. Moreover, since thinking preferences 
appear to be as much a function of interests as well as culture (Talbot & Geyer, 1991), indus- 
try and strategy may actually “self select” the people attracted to a company. This may also 
partially explain the resulting patterns here. In low-technology industries, like two of the 
cases (Hungarian buses and plastics producing equipment in the U.S.) included in the 
present cross-national comparisons, the early stages of product development which are not 
science driven, are more likely to be influenced by culture. Product design and process 
design in both situations are likely to be less and more influenced by culture, respectively, 
because process design is downstream in the process and more influenced by plant condi- 
tions. Product design is driven by customer requirements and should be less influenced by 
the culture of the provider. This is summarized as a model for testing in Figure 1 below. 
A broad survey of cultural differences in product development appears to be one alter- 
native methodology to follow-up on these case studies. If industry makes a difference in 
the pattern of cultural influences, a sample of sufficient magnitude to make these compar- 
isons would be desirable. Resolving the clustering and measurement issues for high and 
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FIGURE 1 


















low technology industries will be one of the challenges of this research. The focus on early 
concept development and culture appears to warrant further, more extensive research. 
There are a number of alternative paths that this research stream might follow. For 
example, one might take candidate countries to sample within each major trading group 
(e.g., Japan, the U.S. or Germany, or Korea, Canada, and Italy) to compare. There will, of 
course, always be tradeoffs, between coverage and the cost of the research effort. Another 
strategy would be to compare several countries within two groups (e.g., Korea, Hong 
Kong, Japan and Germany, Spain, and Belgium). Finally, any two countries between 
groups could be compared (e.g., Japan and Germany). However, comparing, say, the U.S. 
and Canada, or Germany and France, or Japan and Korea, would not make much sense for 
this line of research. 
Even as one expands beyond the case study approach to this cross-national research 
stream, there will be opportunities for the recognition of theoretical, methodological, or 
practical emergent trends. If, for example, the world makes good on cross-national person- 
nel movement; if we develop reliable methods of culture-free self-report or archival 
analysis; and if we find that a post-cold war world is more similar than different, then the 
economic and environment preservation issues that could respond to technological innova- 
tion may finally surpass political and racial issues that have often dominated intercultural 
relationships. 
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